One Big Beautiful Treaty—or Trap?

Canada must ask: is now the moment to ink something that could artificially tie Canada to an unstable United States?

Jul 02, 2025

Canada today stands at a diplomatic crossroads. Former head of the Business Council on National Issues Tom d’Aquino has made an audacious proposal for a comprehensive Senate-ratified treaty with the United States, one that would bind both nations in a legally robust pact surpassing USMCA’s executive-agreement nature. Such a “Big Beautiful Treaty” could lock in trade, defense, digital regulation, immigration, and much more—and, crucially, command U.S. Senate approval, offering greater durability and enforcement than grandiose executive orders or ad hoc trade deals. For d’Aquino, the process does not matter (“any agreement is good for Canada if the contents are very beneficial”) so long as the United States is forced to live up to its obligations.

Canada must ask: is now the moment to ink something that could artificially tie Canada to an unstable United States, especially when agreements must in the short term be tools for managing Trump’s volatility? Recent months have proven Trump’s unpredictability. First, steel and aluminum tariffs were suddenly rolled out, in defiance of the USMCA. Then came threats tied to illicit fentanyl, immigration, defense spending, and, critically, Canada’s digital services tax (DST). Ottawa enacted its 3 percent DST in 2024, one year ahead of implementation, but Trump responded with a categorical threat: “terminating ALL discussions on Trade with Canada” unless it folded. Facing the prospect of 11–50 percent tariffs, Canada quickly scrapped the DST just hours before implementation, rescinding it to restore talks ahead of a July 21 deadline..

If something this narrow can be weaponized, why would Trump not threaten Canada’s supply-management system, Quebec’s French-language protections, or even the Goods and Services Tax? Indeed, U.S. threats have reportedly extended toward “foreign value-added taxes,” plausibly including the provincial HST framework, as implied leverage points. Supply management has long been a red flag for Trump, who has called for it to be eliminated, targeting Canada’s dairy and poultry protections. Bilingualism, constitutionally entrenched in Canada, could easily become political flashpoints. Trump may demand limits on French-language commercial requirements in Quebec under the guise of “trade liberalization.”

Carney understands this precarious balance. His government effectively froze the DST to restart talks, not as a policy decision but as strategic leverage exchange: a bargain that forestalled U.S. retaliation with Section 301 and paved the way for broader negotiations. Carney's declarative posture that “Canada will take as long as necessary, but no longer” frames this as a crisis-management negotiation, not the sealing of a century-long capitulation .

Yet d’Aquino’s prize, a Senate-ratified, constitutional-level treaty, carries its own perils for Canada. A binding pact with a fixed expiry or renewal date risks anchoring Canada to U.S. political currents far beyond Trump. Moreover, ratification itself requires U.S. bipartisan consensus: in a polarized Senate, achieving meaningful ratification for a mega-treaty by late July is implausible.

Hence Canada should, if proceeding, keep its elbows up and insist on review mechanisms, sunset provisions, and renewal triggers tied to measurable benchmarks—not open-ended legal fetters. The aim: a treaty fit for 2025–2029, not immutable stitches meant to weave Canada into whatever form of U.S. government emerges by 2030.

Canada must insist on a treaty architecture built with exit ramps and adaptivity, rather than binding rigidity. An ideal treaty would include sunset clauses and a modular structure. Key chapters like digital regulation, supply management, and cultural protections could be set to expire functionally by January 2029 (or earlier) unless actively renewed. This ensures the agreement serves as a tool for current turbulence, not a shackle. Provisions could stipulate automatic review hearings or renegotiation if the United States invokes emergency trade powers such as Section 232/301 tariffs, if it imposes new unilateral demands, or threatens annexation. For instance, if Trump or a successor sharply expands steel or dairy tariffs, or declares the GST/HST as a trade barrier or retargets Canadian language laws, Canada must be able to suspend related treaty chapters swiftly.

These design mechanisms would enable Ottawa to secure Senate-level commitment from Washington, raising the political and constitutional stakes, while retaining the capacity to walk away if the United States weaponizes Canadian domestic policy..

Canada’s treaty strategy must anticipate three divergent U.S. futures:

Continued Trump-era volatility past 2029: Treaties risk becoming platforms for coercive bargaining—Canada could be locked into disputes over supply management, bilingualism or GST, powerless to disengage.
Return to liberal governance post-2029: A comprehensive treaty could anchor deeply integrated cooperation—Canada gains stable market access, enhanced cooperation, macroeconomic predictability.
Deeper structural executive authority and erosion of norms: The U.S. might institutionalize executive unilateralism (tariffs, investigations), using Canadian treaty commitments as leverage. Exit could be legally possible but politically and economically costly.

Tom d’Aquino blithely assumes the second scenario: that having a Senate-ratified treaty creates durable North American norms. But events since early 2025 suggest Canada must not take American institutional resilience for granted. Trump has repeatedly threatened tariffs, targeted auto, steel, dairy, and floated annexation, even mooting retaliation to bilingualism and the GST.

With a July 21 deadline from the G7, Canada is pressed to move fast, but haste risks. U.S. senators may balk at sweeping treaty language, or will demand binding text on immigration, fentanyl, supply chains—making Senate ratification impossible in time. Compressed timelines may produce ambiguous provisions, weak withdrawal clauses, or lack clarity on what counts as a “review trigger.”

An alternative is a phased approach. Right now, Canada can negotiate immediate priorities: freeze existing tariffs, agree to rescind DST (which Canada did under U.S. pressure), lock in security cooperation and defense spending commitments, and curb sudden supply chain shocks. These provisions can be packaged in modular annexes, rather than embedded in a single broad treaty. Once U.S. political outcomes appear clearer beyond the scheduled 2026 midterms, revisit remaining chapters—digital tax alignment, cultural protections, energy grid integration—with a view to deeper, durable treaties that include sunset and modularity. This staggered route lets Canada use treaty design for immediate stability without prematurely tying its hands given U.S. political uncertainty.

Canada’s immediate challenge is surviving the Trump-era: recovering market access, defending key sectors (dairy, steel), and securing cooperation across trade, defense, and regulation. A Senate-ratified treaty could signal seriousness—but only if it remains structured, flexible, and reviewable.

Tom d’Aquino’s “One Big Beautiful Treaty” rightly calls for enhanced commitment—Senate assent would elevate the agreement beyond an executive exchange. Yet Carney must ensure Canada does not mistake legal symbolism for strategic prudence. A treaty constructed hastily, without exit ramps or political triggers, risks becoming a tool of U.S. coercion—especially if Trump or successors continue weaponizing the GST, supply management, or bilingualism.

Hence Canada should pursue a modular, re-assessable treaty with built-in sunsets (functionally expiring by January 2029), clear review/suspension triggers tied to U.S. executive action, and phase 1 “wins” now, and the Phase 2 architecture later, to match political cycles in the U.S.

Executed prudently, this path allows Ottawa to seize the negotiation’s energy without forfeiting sovereignty. In effect, Canada can craft a treaty that manages Trump, but does not become a cage, preserving Canada's adaptability even as it shores up North American integration.

References:

https://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-us-canada-trade-dispute/story?id=123335160

https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/canada-faces-massive-challenge-nato-080016882.html

https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/the-empty-case-for-canadas-five-percent-defence-pledge

https://cdhowe.org/publication/if-trump-attacks-canadas-gst-next-we-must-defend-it/

https://financialpost.com/news/economy/higher-deficits-canada-nato-defence-spending-target

https://financialpost.com/news/gst-trump-trigger-reciprocal-tariffs

https://financialpost.com/opinion/digital-service-tax-supply-management-bad-ideas

https://financialpost.com/opinion/jack-mintz-strategy-dealing-trump-tariffs-negotiation

https://gizmodo.com/trump-bullies-canada-into-killing-its-big-tech-tax-2000621923

https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-commits-to-new-nato-defence-spending-target-of-five-per-cent-of-gdp

https://nationalpost.com/opinion/tasha-kheiriddin-carney-will-have-no-choice-but-to-kill-supply-management